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Abstract
Intense water disputes in the United States are being caused by new and conflicting demands
from many quarters and changes in water availability that appear to be caused by climate
change. Projections of heightened water conflict signify the need to understand the best
methods of resolving these disputes. The published literature on negotiation suggests that
parties are more likely to develop sustainable agreements and cooperative relationships
through an integrative approach to negotiation. In these instances, negotiators work to
understand each other's interests to jointly create and distribute value. This thesis examines
the role of value creation in water allocation negotiations to determine if and how it enables
agreement. Water allocation negotiations in the Lower Colorado River and Apalachicola-Flint-
River Basins are compared; an agreement was reached in the first case but not the second. My
findings support the hypothesis that value creation enables agreement; they also suggest that
even when value is created, its allocation may prevent agreement among parties. Findings are
used to deduce a broader set of lessons associated with value creation and the benefits of an
integrative approach to negotiating water allocations.
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1 Value Creation in Water Allocation Negotiations
"The past century is no longer a reasonable guide to thefuturefor water management"
(U.S. Global Change Research Program 2009:49)
Introduction
In 1908, the Governors of the United States convened at the White House to discuss the
country's growing reliance on natural resources (Conference of Governors 1909). State and
federal officials were concerned over the impact that industrialization might have on the
proper use of water and land. The Conference participants authored a declaration recognizing
water as "a most valuable asset," and stating that its conservation should "engage unremittingly
the attention of the Nation, the States, and the People in earnest cooperation" (Conference of
Governors 1909: 2). At the time, water conflicts were commonplace in the Southwest. More
than one hundred years later, the Governors' call for cooperation in managing water resources
is relevant not only in the Southwest but across the whole country.
Intense water disputes are being caused by new, conflicting demands from many
quarters (U.S. Department of the Interior 2003, Scholz and Stiftel 2005). Water use has grown
dramatically in the United States (Figure 1.1). Withdrawals are used for drinking water, food
production, power generation, and a range of industrial purposes. Water does not have to be
withdrawn to serve an important use: navigation and recreation involve the direct use of a
watercourse. Water also sustains all of our natural ecosystems (Richter et al 2003). In many
places across the country-especially those experiencing continued population growth-
demands for water are increasingly in conflict.
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Figure 1.1 Trends in total water withdrawals by water-use category, 1950-2000 (Hutson et al
2004)
Climate change is compounding all of these conflicts as it increases the variability of
water supplies. The impact of climate change is manifesting in numerous ways: the frequency
of drought, earlier snowmelt peaks, changes in runoff quantity, and changes in water quality
and stream temperature (U.S. Global Change Research Program 2009). Groundwater supplies
are also being affected. All parts of the country will experience some or all of these effects, to
varying degrees. Observed drought trends, for example, have increased or decreased in
different parts of the continental United States (Figure 1.2).1 Water officials now regard
uncertainty as a defining characteristic of water availability (Clark and Kubly 2011).
1Climate change can decrease drought because rising temperatures can increase evaporation rates.
Cumulative water in the atmosphere causes increased precipitation (U.S. Global Change Research Program
2009).
9
Increasing drought Decreasing drought
Figure 1.2 Observed drought trends, 1958-2007. Hatching indicates significant trends. (U.S.
Global Change Research Program 2009, in Guttman and Quayle 1996)
Competing water uses and climate change have resurfaced old disputes and given rise
to new ones. Disagreements between states, as well as between individual users and
providers, have been litigated before the Supreme Court since the 1800s (Sax et al 2006).
Historically, water conflict has been endemic to the Southwest (Reisner 1986, U.S. Global
Change Research Program 2009). These ongoing disagreements led to the formation of the
"Law of the River," a collection of compacts, laws, court decisions, contracts and regulations
that dictate how Colorado River water is allocated and managed. Even so, Colorado River users
continue to fight over water. Indeed, water conflict is "highly likely," and there is "moderate" or
"substantial" conflict potential in most Western states (Figure 1.3). Lakes, waterways big and
small, and groundwater are all expected to be under contention.
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Figure 1.3 Potential water supply conflicts by 2025 (U.S. Department of the Interior 2003)
Over the past several decades, disputes have emerged in places not commonly
associated with water conflict. In 2010, for example, the Supreme Court decided a high profile
water allocation dispute between South and North Carolina (South Carolina v. North Carolina
2010). In the Florida Everglades, water officials have been trying to reconcile an increase in
demand for public water supply with environmental impacts of freshwater use. Indeed, water
conflict is now prevalent east of the Mississippi River (Greenberg 2009, U.S. Global Change
Research Program 2009).
Projections of heightened water conflict signify the need to understand the best
methods of resolving these disputes. By drawing on negotiation theory and examining the
outcomes of two water allocation negotiations, this thesis aims to contribute to such an
understanding. Specifically, I examine the role of value creation in water allocation
negotiations to determine if and how it enables agreement. Using comparative, qualitative
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techniques, water allocation negotiations in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint-River and
the Colorado River Basins are compared; an agreement was reached in the first case but not the
second. Findings support my hypothesis that value creation enables agreement but also
provide important lessons about the role and challenges of value creation in water allocation
negotiations.
Value Creation in Water Allocation Negotiations
Water is frequently under dispute in terms of how supplies are allocated and to whom
(for which purposes) (Folger, Cody, and Carter 2010). An allocation is a measured amount of
water set aside for a particular purpose or use. Water allocation can represent a guaranteed
distribution or a more complex contingent set of arrangements that try to account for changes
in water availability or use (Congressional Budget Office 2006).
U.S. states generally determine how to allocate water, as there is no overarching
national water policy. States allocate water according to a system of riparianism, an alternative
approach called prior appropriation, or a hybrid of the two (Sax et al 2006). In riparianism, the
water law of the East, landowners adjacent to a water body have the right to use that water. All
water uses must be "reasonable." In prior appropriation, which is most commonly applied in
Western states, those with water rights are allotted a defined quantity and time period for use.
In the West, all water uses must be "beneficial." States use these two administrative
frameworks to allocate water resources to users within their states.
Even with these administrative frameworks in place, water conflicts arise within states
and between states. Jurisdictions including cities, counties and water supply districts, as well
as individual users, dispute each other's right to water or contest their state's allocation
decisions (Sax et al 2006). There are many reasons for this-chief among them are how the
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water is being used, how much is or is not available, and how long certain uses are meant to
remain in place. Water conflict also occurs between states. This is often the case when a
watercourse traverses one or more state boundaries, or when water serves as the boundary
between several states.
Water disputes are usually settled in court, but this approach to problem-solving has its
limitations. Litigation is expensive, and there is no telling how long it might last (Thorson et al
2006). It is difficult for a court to address all the needs of all parties involved-some parties
are likely be left unsatisfied or out of the decision all together (Susskind, Levy, and Thomas-
Larmer 2000). Finally, judicial decisions cannot adjust to changes in the environment,
economy, or demographics - all factors that weigh heavily on water needs and uses
(Dellapenna 1999, Huang 2006).
The limitations on the courts are especially acute in interstate disputes. The Supreme
Court uses an equitable apportionment doctrine, which bases water decisions on notions of
fairness (Tarlock 1985). However, members of the court have expressed reservations about
ruling in water disputes, because interstate problems are "more likely to be wisely solved" by
the states themselves than by any court (New York v. New Jersey 1921). Congressional
allocation is another method to resolve water disputes, but it is hardly used, since members of
Congress believe that the states involved know the problem best (Carriker 2000).
An alternative-though not always successful-approach to resolving water disputes is
collaborative problem-solving through negotiation. Parties engaged in environmental disputes
began experimenting with this approach since the 1970s (Susskind and McKearnan 1999), and
it began to gain traction in the 1990s (Gerlak 2008). Collaborative processes can "produce not
only effective options for how actors can move forward together to deal with their problems,
but also individual and collective learning that will help make the community more adaptive
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and resilient" (Innes and Booher 2010: 9). Coordination among states is achieved through
interstate compacts. Because these compacts are voluntary, they seem to provide the most
agreeable option, at least from the standpoint of the states. Voluntary agreements allow those
most familiar with the issues to make the actual water allocation decisions.
Whether parties reach agreement depends largely on how they approach the
negotiations. Two primary approaches exist. The first, more conventional kind is distributive
and assumes a zero-sum outcome (Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry 2010). In these instances, one
side wins and the other side loses. Parties assume that there is a fixed amount of value to be
allocated. The goal of all negotiators is to claim as much of that value for themselves or their
side as possible. As a result, little effort goes into learning about the other sides' concerns. In a
distributive negotiation, value-claiming often leads to stalemate or collapse, especially when
one or more parties feel that the outcome is unfair (Susskind, Levy, and Thomas-Larmer 2000).
Distributive negotiations tend to undermine relationships in the long term.
A second approach to negotiation is integrative. In these instances, negotiators work to
understand each other's interests and to jointly create a way to expand the "pie" through value
creation (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 1991). To create value, it is helpful for parties to participate
in a period of inventing without committing and to explore packages or trades (Susskind and
Cruikshank 1987). Parties can use this approach to simultaneously pursue conflicting goals
and respond to sticking points, as "the set of differences among negotiations is often the engine
that drives their joint action and may point them toward potential gains (Lax and Sebenius
1986: 91). Integrative negotiations help the parties improve relationships over the long-term,
which contributes to the agreement's stability over time (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).
Good process design and management are important to integrative negotiation.
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The value created in an integrative negotiation can take various forms. Albrecht and
Albrecht (1993) provide a framework that highlights five value categories (Table 1.1) that can
work synergistically to create more options. More value indicates a greater possibility for
agreement. After creating all the value they can, parties must still engage in a process of
distributing and claiming. Once options or packages have been identified, they must address
the practical details involved in trading value, to ensure the durability of their agreements
(Albrecht and Albrecht 1993).
Table 1.1 Value categorization framework adapted from Albrecht and Albrecht (1993)
Value categories Description
Money Can take different forms (e.g., cash, credit, check, stocks, bonds, securities)
Property Physical and intellectual
Actions "Who does what"; what parties will or will not do
Risks Who covers for unexpected outcomes or a loss
Rights 'Who's allowed to do what"; something to which a party is entitled
While Albrecht and Albrecht's categories of value are useful for the purposes of this
paper, they are partial. Different disciplines have different theories of value. Axiology is the
philosophy and science of value (Oxford University Press 2000). Sociology discusses value as
the convictions held by individuals and groups of people. In economics, value is achieved and
revealed through market transactions between producers and consumers. Albrecht and
Albrecht define their categories of value as the "substance or medium of exchange in a
negotiation; various tangible and intangible elements..." (33). This definition suggests that
their categories of value are not necessarily informed by one discipline, but nor are they
exhaustive.
Unfortunately, parties engaged in water disputes tend to take a distributive approach to
negotiations (Dore and Smith 2010, Islam and Susskind 2012). They view water as a fixed
rather than a flexible resource. This approach inhibits the creation of value. It may also
compound the challenges the parties face (Scholz and Stiftel 2006) including the changing
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nature of the conflict (Susskind and Islam 2012), as well as technical complexity and scientific
uncertainty (Dore and Smith 2010).
Research Question and Methods
The scholarship on factors that enable parties to reach agreement over water allocation
postulates that parties ought to think hard about ways to create value. This thesis tests that
hypothesis. My findings provide clear evidence for the important role value creation can play
in water allocation negotiations.
I apply a comparative, qualitative approach, examining two cases in some detail-the
Lower Colorado River Basin and the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin. The parties
in the first case reached agreement, but those in the second case did not. I examine the history
of water conflict in each setting and look closely at how the negotiations were designed and
executed. To evaluate value creation, I identify the parties' responses to key sticking points.
How the parties handled these points is critical-they either find a way to resolve these sticking
points or they are left with an impasse. I use Albrecht and Albrecht's (1993) categories of
value-money, property, actions, risks, and rights-to identify the kinds of value the parties
tried to create at each sticking point. In addition to ascribing value to the terms of the deals
discussed, I ascribe value to what was actually accomplished (when possible). Thus, I compare
the potential value created and the actual value gained in both negotiations.
An increase in water-related research and data availability provides an opportunity to
pursue comparative water studies (Wescoat 2009). Without a consistent analytic framework,
however, comparative water studies lack "rigor or cultural salience to shape action, policy, or
meaning" (Wescoat 2012: 2). I therefore use Albrecht and Albrecht's categorization of value to
identify the value that is proposed or gained. However, I draw an analogy between cases when
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I deduce prescriptions from these findings. There are no two cases that are exactly similar, and
thus I use these cases as distinct examples and analogies that can be learned from. Parties
should consider recommendations insofar as they are deemed applicable and useful (Meyer et
al 1998).
I searched for water allocation disputes in which agreement had and had not been
reached. In August 2003, officials from the states of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida failed to
reach an agreement regarding the allocation of water from the ACF Basin. Conflict between the
states began in the late 1980s, and the parties had been in negotiations for over five years. The
conflict was ultimately relegated to the courts, where it remains today. At about the same time,
the State of California, the United States Department of the Interior, and local water agencies
entered into the Colorado River Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA). By many
accounts, the QSA brought peace to a long-standing and intensifying water dispute among the
signatories to the agreement.
There are other important parallels between the two cases. When the disputes
emerged, both regions were experiencing rapid population growth that pitted non-urban uses
against urban needs for water. Both disputes involved agricultural and environmental
interests. Further, both regions experienced severe drought in the decades leading up to the
conflict. Both cases date back to the late 1980s, and both negotiations ended in 2003, only a
few months apart. Finally, the two regions face similar water problems going forward
(Sansonetti and Quast 2003, Greenberg 2009).
I reviewed primary documents and media reports. I also conducted 22 semi-structured
interviews with people who work for organizations or government agencies involved in the
negotiations. Interviews were conducted in-person and over the phone with people contacted
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through snowball sampling. Data were coded using a list of sticking points, responses to
sticking points, and categories of value created.
It appears that the parties in the Lower Colorado River case created sufficient value to
reach agreement, while the quantity and distribution of value in the ACF Basin case was
insufficient to enable agreement. These findings confirm my hypothesis about the importance
of creating value and provide a broader set of lessons associated with the benefits of an
integrative approach to negotiating water allocations.
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2 Case Study: Value Creation during Water Allocation
Negotiations in the ACF Basin
"The task before us is tremendous, both in scope and in complexity, how to share and steward wisely the surface
waters of the confluence of nearly 40,000 square miles of Southeastern river basin. Nothing of this scope has ever
been accomplished east of the Mississippi, to my knowledge, but I can assure the members of this panel it will not
be the last challenge of this nature, whether we succeed or fail."
Lindsay Thomas, Federal Commissioner, ACF River Basin Compact Commission
(U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary and Administrative Law 2001)
Water Allocation
The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin is located in the Southeastern
United States. It is composed of three distinct but connected and descending rivers (Figure
2.1). The Chattahoochee River begins just outside and northeast of Atlanta, Georgia. It flows
south, serving as the boundary between the states of Alabama and Georgia. The Flint River
shares the Chattahoochee's headwaters. It passes through central and southwest Georgia
before merging with the Chattahoochee to form the Apalachicola River in the Florida
Panhandle. There, the watercourse meets its end as it flows into the Gulf of Mexico. Combined,
the rivers drain into 19,800 square miles across the three states (Couch, Hopkins, and Hardy
1996).
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Figure 2.1 Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (Stallins 2011)
Water in the ACF basin has multiple uses (Davis and Jordan 2006). Water withdrawals
primarily serve municipal and industrial needs in metropolitan Atlanta. Downstream of
Atlanta, within Georgia, the ACF's surface water and groundwater are used for irrigation.
Water is mostly used for recreation, commercial navigation, and hydropower generation in
Alabama. The ACF watercourse sustains Florida's Apalachicola Bay ecosystem. The Bay is also
a very productive oyster bed: 90% of Florida's oysters are farmed there (Couch, Hopkins, and
Hardy 1996).
Water for these uses is provided through the management of a system of dams and
reservoirs. Five federal dams hold 11% of the basin's annual flow (Burke 2004). Buford Dam
creates Lake Sidney Lanier (Lake Lanier), which comprises 62% of the basin's storage system
(U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). At the time of its construction, the dam was intended to
support flood control, navigation, and hydropower. The Water Supply Act of 1958 authorized
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the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to also allocate storage in the reservoirs for municipal
supply through temporary contracts of limited quantities.
Historically, water allocation has not been a source of interstate conflict in the
Southeast (Davis and Jordan 2006). Allocation within states in this region is based on a
"reasonable-use" riparian doctrine: property owners along a watercourse can use that water in
a reasonable way and as long as it does not adversely affect others along the watercourse. As
long as there was enough water for water uses within and between the three states, conflict
was averted.
Conflict over Water Allocation
Conflict in the ACF basin began in the 1980s and was triggered by metropolitan
Atlanta's growing water supply needs. The region was experiencing dramatic growth; from
1970 to 2000, it went from 1.5 to 3.4 million residents (Atlanta Regional Commission 2010).
This growth increased the demand for water (Figure 2.2), 72% of which came from Lake Lanier
(Carter et al 2008). The region withdrew: 289 million gallons per day (mgd) in 1980; 459 mgd
in 1990; and 606 mgd in 2000 (Lipford 2004). Demographers projected that metropolitan
Atlanta's 2000 population would double by 2030 (Burke 2004). The commensurate water
needed would be 705 mgd by 2030.
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Figure 2.2 Water withdrawals by principal water-use categories in the ACF Basin, 1970-90
(Couch, Hopkins, and Hardy 1996)
The growing water need was complicated by the Corps' municipal contracts, as they
were made for a limited time and quantities. In 1972, the US Congress authorized the Corps to
study and make recommendations on ways to respond to metropolitan Atlanta's growing
water needs (Carriker 2000). The Corps issued a draft report in 1989 which recommended a
reallocation of 529 mgd (Economist 1991) of water from Lake Lanier to secure Atlanta's water
need through 2010 (Carriker 2000). Two years later, Atlanta attempted to secure an additional
supply by submitting a proposal to the Corps to build a dam in the Tallapoosa Basin, only about
five miles from the Alabama border (Burke 2004).
Alabama and Florida officials fervently opposed the Corps' plan, and for several reasons.
Alabama was concerned that a larger allocation for Atlanta would limit the availability of water
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resources needed for its own economic growth (Bryan and Rose 2006). In June 1990, the state
filed suit to enjoin the Corps from reallocating the water on the basis that the diversions failed
to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act in the Environmental Impact Statement
(Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1990). Siding with the Corps, Georgia became a fourth
party to the lawsuit to assert its sovereign power as a state to manage its water resources. The
lawsuit marked the first time the three ACF Basin states were engaged in water conflict.
An underlying concern for all three parties was an increasing frequency of drought. In
the 1980s, the basin experienced three severe droughts (Figure 2.3) that had disastrous
consequences. The droughts hampered navigation along the Chattahoochee River, and they
affected power generation (Stephenson 2001). In the 1986 drought alone, farmers across the
South lost an estimated $2 billion on crops (New York Times 1986). When the flow rate into
Apalachicola Bay fell to less than half the usual rate, the Bay was declared a federal disaster
area (Burke 2004). The droughts increased demand on ACF water resources (Dellapenna
2006).
Id
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Figure 2.3 Unimpaired flows at the Columbus Gauge on Chattahoochee River (Leitman, Dowd,
and Holbeck-Pelham 2003)
The ways that the Corps and Atlanta tried to secure additional water for the region, as
well as the prospects of unstable water availability, induced conflict between states.
23
Water Allocation Negotiations
Even as Alabama and Florida filed suit against the Corps, it was in all four states'
interest to explore the possibility of a negotiated agreement There was no telling how long
litigation might last (Lipford 2004). Even worse, a court decision might not be to their liking;
nor would it necessarily resolve the fundamental question of how much water each state
should or could use. In 1991, the three states signed an agreement to undertake an
information-gathering process. To assist the negotiations, the Corps requested and was given
Congressional funds to begin the ACF Comprehensive Water Resources Study, an in-depth
assessment of the ACF's water availability and uses (Jordan 2001). The states officially joined
as equal partners eighteen months into the study in 1992. Technical consultants and advisors
were jointly agreed upon, a financial pool was created, and officials from all four parties
administered the funds. The courts stayed the litigation to allow the joint-fact finding effort to
proceed and encourage a settlement (Jordan 2001). In a matter of two years, the states went
from engaging in litigation to working jointly toward a solution.
While the Comprehensive Study produced new and significant information about water
use in the Basin, it did not and could not resolve the question of how to apportion the water. In
1997, as the Study came close to an end, the states and federal government agreed to enter in
an ACF River Basin Compact to continue work on the allocation formula (U.S. 1997). The
Compact read that the formula "may be represented by a table, chart, mathematical calculation
or any other expression of the Commission's apportionment of waters pursuant to this
compact" (U.S. 1997: 2). The Compact also promoted "interstate comity, removing causes of
present and future controversies, and equitably apportioning the surface waters of the ACF"
(U.S. 1997: 1). The states finally had the legal authority and the coordinating mechanism to
decide how to apportion the ACF waters.
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The Compact was a historic achievement. It was the first interstate allocation compact
in the Southeast, as well as the first interstate compact since major environmental legislation of
the 1970s (Leitman 2005). The Compact created a Commission that would handle decision-
making, and it included each state's governor or an appointee (U.S. 1997). Commission
members would promote the interests of all the relevant stakeholders in their states, and full
agreement among them was required. A Federal Commissioner was appointed to represent the
interests of more than ten federal agencies; the Commissioner could also veto an agreement if
it conflicted with federal laws and regulations. Under the Compact negotiations, state officials
had to hold public hearings and invite public comment for sixty days after agreeing to a
formula. The agreement would then be subject to review and ratification by the Federal
Commissioner. With the authorized Compact in hand and a structure within which to move
forward, state officials expressed optimism at the prospects of reaching agreement. Indeed, on
the day of its signing, the Atlanta Journal Constitution's headline about the Compact read, "End
to three-state water war seen; Governors prepare to sign rare interstate compact on sharing
resources of rivers" (Seabrook 1998).
Optimism over the Compact was quickly tempered by differences between the states,
which became evident early. In the first year of negotiations, the states created a statement of
"principles" which would be used to decide the allocation formula (Moore 1999). These
principles revealed three of the states' biggest points of disagreement. First, Florida and
Alabama favored instituting and regulating caps on metropolitan Atlanta's consumptive water
use. The caps would involve looking at the state's various uses, such as irrigation, and setting
limits on different types of uses. Georgia opposed consumption caps on the basis that they
threatened the state's sovereignty (Carriker 2000).
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The second major point of contention involved how to manage the flow rate into the
Apalachicola Bay. Georgia proposed an average flow rate based on seasonal fluctuations
(Seabrook 1999a). Alabama and Florida did not agree to a minimum flow rate because they
preferred a flow rate that mimicked a natural flow regime. Florida, in particular, wanted to
protect a natural hydrograph that ebbs and flows, because it sustained the ecosystem and
oyster bed. The Corps supported this view in a draft environmental impact statement (U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers 1998).
A third major difference concerned ways the upstream management of the reservoirs
would be used to regulate the downstream flows. Georgia favored operating Lake Lanier as if
"drought was imminent" (Moore 1999: 5), which meant keeping the reservoirs at full capacity.
The state had an interest in keeping the reservoirs full to sustain the lake's recreational value,
estimated to be nearly $2 billion per year (Burke 2004). Alabama and Florida, however,
preferred that the reservoirs be managed to support downstream flows, or to use Lake Lanier
for "sharing the excess and sharing the pain" (Burke 2004: 10).
The public process undertaken by state officials heightened the conflict. The states took
informal and varied approaches to keeping parties within their states informed and engaged.
At the onset of negotiations, Florida had many meetings with stakeholders, but those tapered
off as negotiations progressed (Leitman 2005). Stakeholders then started having meetings on
their own. Georgia had the Georgia Advisory Committee, which consisted of a wide range of
stakeholders from throughout the state, but meetings were mostly to debrief the stakeholders
rather than to formally engage them in the process. Alabama held large public meetings, but
these tended to focus more on the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa Basin Interstate Compact, which
had separate, ongoing interstate compact negotiations (Leitman 2005). The tension between
state officials and parties within their states became particularly acute in Georgia, where
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metropolitan Atlanta's water needs ran up against downstream uses (e.g., farming).
Conservation groups in all three states insisted on having a voice in the process: in August
1999, they formed the Tri-state Conservation Coalition, which frequented the states'
negotiation meetings (Leitman 2005). The overall informality and inconsistency in the
inclusion of non-state parties led to negative media attention and prompted non-state parties
to exert significant pressure on their negotiators.
The way that state officials negotiated with each other also inhibited progress.
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia officials drafted individual agreements and presented them to
each other during the public meetings. The agreements reflected their positions on the central
allocation numbers under consideration (Burke 2004). This meant that each proposal was
authored by a single state, making it difficult for the other states to sign on during public
meeting and provoked posturing (Seabrook 1999b): "One hundred fifty people sitting there
representing all of the various organizations led a great deal of posturing and no real good give
and take-on the order of, 'If I do this, will you do that?'... It was more like, 'Here is my position.
Your position is this, and we'll talk about it later" (Burke 2004: 256). Publicly, state officials
would also often publicly state that they were prepared for legal recourse if an agreement was
not reached (Seabrook 2000). The progress in the negotiations was challenged both by how
state officials engaged interests within their state and by the ways they engaged each other.
Tension between the states had heightened, but officials continued to work toward an
agreement. The states had originally set January 1, 1999 as their deadline, but they voted to
extend it multiple times. Some progress was evident. The states, for example, began to
collaborate to define the parameters of a natural hydrograph for the ACF basin. However, the
states' major points of disagreement remained unresolved. In an attempt to salvage the
compact, at the suggestion of ACF Compact Commissioner Lindsey Thomas, the states agreed to
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mediation. In the summer of 2000, state officials participated in a mediation facilitated by
Talbot ("Sandy") D'Alemberte, President of Florida State University, whom they jointly chose
(Florida 2000). The states learned more about each other's' interests but did not get closer to
deciding on an allocation formula. The states made halting progress and had no clear end in
sight.
After the mediation, negotiations were hampered by two new lawsuits involving
metropolitan Atlanta's efforts to secure more water. In May 2000, the state reintroduced plans
to reallocate water from Lake Lanier to meet Atlanta's demand until 2030 (Snowden 2005).
Florida and Alabama made public appeals for the state to put the plans on hold until an
allocation formula was determined. The Corps denied Georgia's request on the basis that the
agency needed congressional authorization to approve the request. Georgia filed suit against
the Corps to challenge its decisions. In the summer of 2002, Florida joined the lawsuit as a
defendant to challenge what it saw as a "de facto partial apportionment of the water" that
violated the Compact (Georgia v. US Army Corps ofEngineers v. Caldera 2002: 6). Negotiations
continued against the backdrop of motivated legal recourse.
A second lawsuit complicated the negotiations. The Southeastern Federal Power
Customers (SeFPC), a group of power distributors in metropolitan Atlanta, filed suit against the
Corps in December 2000 (Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera 2003). SeFPC
alleged that the Corps was giving Atlanta more water than what was authorized under the
Water Supply Act. Metropolitan Atlanta officials requested and were granted permission to
become a part of confidential mediation between SeFPC and the Corps. Under their settlement
agreement, the Corps would provide metropolitan Atlanta at least twenty years of interim
water supply storage, and Atlanta would compensate SeFPC for the allocations (Southeastern
Federal Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera 2003). News surfaced of the settlement agreement
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reached between the SeFPC, the Corps, and metropolitan Atlanta parties in January 2003.
Alabama and Florida, who had been unaware of metropolitan Atlanta's participation in the
settlement talks, expressed outrage over the "secret settlement" (Shelton 2004). The two
states subsequently filed to have the settlement agreement enjoined, on the grounds that it
violated the Stay Agreement of 1990, and they threatened to pull out of negotiations. The
lawsuits pointed to a looming collapse of the Compact.
As the lawsuits impinged on the states' progress, one final, untried opportunity
provided some hope. Georgia and Alabama elected Republican Governors in the fall of 2002,
making it the first time that all three Governors were members of the same political party. If
the impasse was ever about politics, then the states could now move past it. In the spring of
2003, Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue called a gubernatorial summit; he affirmed, "We'll come
together face-to-face with no staff and hammer this thing out" (Shelton 2003). The Governors
agreed to stay the two new lawsuits, and they signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
at a July meeting in Columbus. The MOU contained an agreed-upon "principles" of the
allocation formula (Florida, Georgia, and Alabama 2003). State officials would use the following
months to figure out the details associated with the implementation of those principles. The
Governors lauded the effort: "When finalized, this agreement will be viewed as a historic one
that will positively impact millions of Georgians, Alabamans and Floridians as well as having a
widespread and positive impact on the environment," said Florida Governor Jeb Bush (Georgia
2003). After five years of negotiations, the states had finally reached an agreement on the
principles of the allocation formula.
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Value Creation
The governors aimed to use the MOU to resolve the states' three sticking points:
consumption caps on metropolitan Atlanta, flows into the Apalachicola Bay, and the
management of reservoirs in times of drought. The MOU itself did not contain the details of
implementation, but the principles agreed upon under the MOU would provide a framework
within which to move forward.
The states agreed to consumptive caps for metropolitan Atlanta, even though Georgia
officials had initially opposed it. Water withdrawals from Lake Lanier would be limited to 705
mgd-the region's estimated water need by 2030 (Burke 2004)-with the possibility of
withdrawing more. Using Albrecht and Albrecht's framework (1993), this cap created value in
the form of "actions" Georgia would take (Table 2.1). For Alabama and Florida, this agreement
meant a reduction in the "risk" of metropolitan Atlanta's monopolization of water. 2
The MOU also contained a minimum flow rate in the Apalachicola Bay. It was assumed
that the downstream flow was contingent on Georgia's upstream actions. Initially, Georgia
proposed a seasonally averaged flow rate, which Florida and Alabama opposed because they
preferred a flow rate that mimicked a natural hydrograph. In the five years of negotiations, the
states had developed weekly variable flow rates. Because the flow rate was contingent on what
Georgia did, the regulation of flow was also a value created by the state's "actions" that reduced
Florida's "risk" of exceedingly low flows (Table 2.1).
The MOU also addressed how the reservoirs would be managed in times of drought.
Alabama and Florida had maintained that the reservoirs should be used during droughts. In
this way, the states would share the adversity. The MOU contained an alternative solution to
2 In the value table, 'proposed value' refers to the source of the value, which differs from proposing an idea for
value. The idea of consumption caps was initially proposed by Florida and Alabama, but the value would not
have been coming from them. That fact is why I indicate that consumption caps come from Georgia.
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managing the water during droughts: Georgia would implement the State Water Management
Plan, with limited use of Lake Lanier. This option created value for Alabama and Florida in the
form of Georgia's required "actions," and it aimed to reduce the "risk" that Florida and Alabama
would be disproportionately affected by drought (Table 2.1).
The MOU would not make it past the next stage of individual state ratification. Florida's
chief negotiator had not been at the meetings, and he and other Florida parties challenged the
way the MOU responded to Florida's previously stated stipulations. In a letter of intent issued
days after the signing of the MOU, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection
Secretary David Struhs, Florida outlined its differences with the MOU (Struhs 2003). The state
wanted guarantees that metropolitan Atlanta would not consume more than 705 mgd or that it
would at least have a chance to have a say in additional withdrawals, but the MOU still gave
metropolitan Atlanta the opportunity to increase its withdrawals beyond the 705 mgd without
a clear role for the other states. Secretary Struhs (2003) said, "Florida's position is that an
allocation formula cannot allow more water to be taken out of the system than is currently
being negotiated during the term of an agreement without mutual consent" (3). Florida also
wanted to ensure that the MOU explicitly stated that the flows into Apalachicola Bay would be
treated as minimums and not targets. The MOU did not contain the language needed to
assuage the state's concern, though Georgia contended that the flows would logically be
exceeded. Finally, Florida wanted to use water drawn down from Lake Lanier during times of
drought, but Lake Lanier was not written into the MOU explicitly for this use. In the end, the
MOU did not give Florida enough assurance to sign on.
The states created value in various ways but nevertheless reached an impasse. After
five years of allocation formula negotiations, the Compact collapsed on August 31, 2003.
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Outcome
Nearly ten years after the collapse of the ACF Compact, negotiations between the states
continue, albeit in a court setting. Following the collapse of the compact, the three stayed
lawsuits were reactivated (Carter el at 2008). More lawsuits followed, most of which were
joined. In a major 2009 court ruling, metropolitan Atlanta was barred from drawing water
from Lake Lanier (U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida 2009). This decision was
overturned in 2011. Today, state officials are engaged in confidential settlement talks to reach
an agreement on how to share the water.
While the states have not yet reached agreement, the interstate Compact made two
important contributions. First, the three states learned a great deal about the Basin and about
their relative uses and future needs (Leitman 2005). They also increased their capacity to
manage water issues; Alabama created a water department, for example. Second, the Compact
helped build public awareness around water issues. More than ever, groups throughout the
Basin are interested in the rivers' fate, as well as in state comity. The most marked example of
this is ACF Stakeholders, a self-organized group composed of groups and individuals who aim
to represent a wide range of interests in the basin. Whether this learning and increased
interest inspires state negotiators to apply a more integrative approach remains to be seen.
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Table 2.1 Value creation in the ACF Basin MOU
Legend
Mone
Pro e
Actions
Risks
Ri hts
Neutral
Key
Caps on metropolitan Atlanta's water use (Actions) reduced Alabama and Florida risk of
insufficient water (Risk).
"The states will support authorization for allocation of storage in Lake Lanier for 705 mgd
(annual average) for water supply. Consideration will be given to additional water supply
in excess of 705 mgd" (Florida, Georgia, and Alabama 2003).
Georgia guaranteed a minimum flow rate of 5,000 cfs (actions) to reduce Florida's risk of
insufficient water supply (risk)
"A guaranteed minimum flow of 5,000 cfs in the Apalachicola River at the Florida state line
during droughts" (Seabrook 2003).
During times of drought, Georgia would implement its Drought Management Plan (actions),
which would help ensure some downstream flows to reduce the risk of disproportionate
impact (risk).
"Georgia shall impose in the relief month the terms and conditions described in the published
Georgia Drought Management Plan as appropriate for the existent level of drought" (Florida,
Georgia, and Alabama 2003)
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Sticking Response to Value
Point soint Alabama Florida Georgia
Atlanta to M M M
withdraw P P P
Water use <705 mgd A A
caps from Lake r
Lanier R R R
Target min. M M M
Flow into flow of 5,000 P P P
Apalachicola cfs into the A A
Bay Apalachicola I
River R R R
Relief M M M
Management provided p P P
of reservoirs according to A AGA's
in times of Drought
drought Management R R R
Plan
3 Case Study: Value Creation during Water Allocation
Negotiations in the Lower Colorado River Basin
"Water is the lifeblood of the American West and thefoundation of its economy. More than a century ago,
American pioneers began harnessing the water of the West, opening vast new landsfor settlement and
development Today, the American West is thefastestgrowing region of the country. Water is its scarcest
resource."
(U.S. Department of the Interior 2003)
Water Allocation
The Colorado River flows 1,450 miles across the American Southwest (California 1997).
From its headwaters in Colorado's Rocky Mountains, the river descends through the states of
Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico before serving as the physical boundary
between Arizona and Nevada, and Arizona and California. The Colorado River waterway
crosses the United States-Mexico border and flows into the Gulf of Mexico. The river and its
tributaries create a basin that covers 246,000 square miles of mostly arid and semiarid North
American landscape (Tucson 2004).
In 1917, the seven basin states formed the League of the Southwest to build regional
collaboration and marshal federal support for Colorado River development (Gimbel 2010). The
League maintained that development was integral to the future of the Southwest because it
would help control drought, floods, improve navigation, minimize land erosion, and ensure an
adequate irrigation system for an agricultural economy. The US Congress was keen to support
this view. In 1922, it issued the Fall-Davis Report, which recommended that the federal
government construct a canal to transfer water from the Colorado River to California's Imperial
Valley, as well as a dam and reservoir near Boulder Canyon (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 1922).
Though unified in their pledge to develop the river, the states were at odds over how to
allocate the water. Water allocation in Western states is based on a prior appropriation
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doctrine, whereby those who first acquire water rights for beneficial uses are made senior to
those who acquire rights at a later date. The upper basin states were concerned that the
doctrine would eventually enable the lower basin states to use their population growth and
agricultural expansion to monopolize Colorado River water (Anderson 2002). To avoid costly
and drawn-out litigation, the seven states successfully appealed to the United States Congress
to pass an act that authorized them to negotiate an "equitable division and apportionment" of
the Colorado River. The states organized the Colorado River Commission; was comprised of
appointed state representatives who negotiated the Colorado River Compact (Colorado River
Commission 1922). The Compact divided the basin into two parts: an upper basin that
included Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico and a lower basin that covered Arizona,
California and Nevada. Each basin would be entitled to 7.5 million-acre feet (maf) per year of
Colorado River water.
The states and federal government's aspirations for the Colorado River became a reality
in the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act (U.S. 1928). The Act implemented the
recommendations in the Fall-Davis Report and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
manage the dam and serve as the River's sole contracting authority. Under the Act, a special
master applied the country's "equitable apportionment" doctrine to allocate the river's water
among the lower basin states: 4.4 maf to California; 2.8 maf to Arizona; and 300,000 maf to
Nevada.
California state officials had to allocate Colorado River water within the state, too.
Water districts for southern California municipal and agricultural uses began forming decades
earlier (National Research Council 2002). Palo Verde Irrigation District, Yuma Project, Imperial
Irrigation District (IID), and Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD) supplied water for
agricultural uses (Figure 3.1). Metropolitan Water District (MWD) supplied water for
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municipal uses. In 1931, officials signed the California Seven Party Agreement on water use
and storage priorities (Table 3.1). The water districts subsequently signed delivery contacts
with the Secretary of the Interior. California's first four priority uses constituted the state's 4.4
maf allocation. Water uses beyond the 4.4 maf allocation would be contingent on surplus
declarations made by the Interior Secretary.
Figure 3.1 Colorado River California service areas (Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California 2009)
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Table 3.1 Colorado River water: Colorado River entitlements (Palo Verde Irrigation District et al
1931)
Priority Entity Maf/yr
1 PYID
2 Yuma Project
3(a) 11D &CVWD3.5
3(b) PVID 3
4 MWD .550
5 MWD .662
6 1ID, CVWD, PVID .300
7 Additional Ag Use All remaining
Conflict Over Water Allocation
Even as the Boulder Canyon Act had established a water allocation formula for the
Lower Basin states, California and Arizona continued to disagree over their water allocations.
A main source of contention for Arizona was that its use of the Gila River, a Colorado River
tributary, was included in its 2.8 maf apportionment. The Supreme Court ruled in Arizona's
favor when the state challenged inclusion allocation in court (Arizona v. California 1964). The
decision enabled Arizona to devise an implementation plan to use its full apportionment, which
included groundwater banking programs and the Central Arizona Project, an aqueduct that
would divert water for central and southern Arizona. However, California had become
dependent on Arizona's and Nevada's unused allocation (California 1997). By 1985, California
was using more than 4.71 maf-well above its 4.4 maf allocation-and its use was expected to
grow to 5.2 maf by 1997 (Table 3.2). Arizona and Nevada, on the other hand, were using less
than half of their apportionment in 1985, but would use all or nearly all of their apportionment
by 1997 (Table 3.2). In 1996, the Interior Secretary ordered California to devise a new water
plan to reduce its water use to 4.4 maf, and he threatened to reduce the state's allocation if it
did not devise a plan to reduce its water use (Babbitt 1996). California would have to wean
itself from the water it had become dependent on.
37
Table 3.2 Colorado River water: Entitlements v. use in thousands acre-feet (California 1997)
Use
Entitlementh 1985 1997 (Estimated)
Lower Basin
California 4,400 4,712 5,168
Agriculture 3,850 3,443 3,922
Urban 550 1,269 1,246
Arizona 2,800 1,200 2,800
Nevada 300 115 250
Upper Basin 7,500 4,000 4,300
Mexico 1,500 Digd Cd
bEntitlement is for a "normal" (non-drought) water year, according to "Law of the River."
Includes Wyomin Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and a small portion of Arizona.
d Not available.
In the 1990s, southern California districts also clashed for two reasons. First, the top
three priorities under the Seven Party Agreement were for agricultural uses, but southern
California increasingly had urban water needs (Table 3.2). San Diego's water needs had grown
the most, and the San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) wanted an independent water
source (Elias 1997). The city bought its water from MWD but did not want to be subject to
MWD's water controls. Second, the top three priorities were given an overall allocation of
3.850, but the number was not disaggregated and allocated between the users (Table 3.1). In
the 1980s, IIDw entered a transfer agreement with MWD without consideration of CVWD's next-
in-line rights (National Research Council 2002), which created friction between the two
agricultural water suppliers. Any major water changes IDI was to make would put CVWD on
the defensive. California water officials thus needed to reconcile their agricultural water uses
with increasing urban demands, as well as with the way that CVWD factored into IID's water
plans.
The lID's use of water also presented a challenge for a new California water plan. In the
mid-1990s, IDI was by far the biggest Colorado River user in California. It was using 70% of the
state's allocation to irrigate more than 500,000 acres of farmland (Yardas and Kusel 2006).
The IID's water use practices were first challenged in 1980, when an Imperial Valley farmer
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filed suit against the district for its misuses of water (National Research Council 1992, Nolan
2002). Agricultural runoff flowed into the Salton Sea, causing the lake level to rise and
submerge his land. The State Water Resources Control Board (State Water Board) investigated
the case and subsequently issued the Water Rights (WR) Decision 1600, which declared that
IID needed to make operational changes to improve its water use practices to reduce runoff
(California 1988). When IID did not immediately act on WR 1600, the State Water Board
issued WR 88-20, which mandated that IID submit a plan and implementation schedule for
water conservation measures.
Projected increases in the variability of water availability in the Colorado River created
uncertainty that compounded the conflict between the states and the districts. Severe drought
had struck the Lower Colorado River Basin four times since the Compact was signed: in the
1930s, 1950s, 1970s and 1980s (United States 1998, McKee 2000)(Figure 3.2). The droughts
did not cause severe damage, but since water uses had grown, state officials grew increasingly
concerned over the consequences the states would have to bear (Diaz and Anderson 1995).
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Figure 3.2 Natural Colorado River flows at Lees Ferry, AZ (National Research Council 2007)
In the early 1990s, conflict and uncertainty converged in the Lower Colorado River
Basin. At the basin scale, California needed to reduce its water use. Within the state, demand
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for urban water uses increased, and IID's water operations needed to be reformed. Pressure
mounted as future water availability projections showed increased variability in water
availability. Meanwhile, the Interior would no longer allow the state to use the surpluses on
which the state had become dependent. The water suppliers and the state and federal
government needed to agree on a new water allocation scheme to accommodate everyone's
needs.
Water Allocation Negotiations
The IID heeded the state's call to reduce its water use by entering talks with SDCWA for
a water transfer. In July 1996, the two parties unveiled the draft terms of a 40-year 200,000 af
transfer (Sterngold 1996), the largest agricultural-to-urban water transfer in US history (San
Diego County Water Authority 2003). The transfer would constitute nearly one third of
SDCWA's water use, and it left open the possibility of transferring another 100,000 af after the
first ten years of the program. SDCWA would pay IID for each af of water that was to be
transferred; IID would use the money to pay for the WR 88-20 conservation measures. The
boards of each district and the California Water Board approved the transfer in April 1998, as
long as it complied with environmental regulations (Imperial Irrigation District 2003). Later
that year, IID and the Bureau of Reclamation initiated the environmental impact studies
required under the National Environmental Policy Act and California Environmental Quality
Act. The transfer seemed like a promising solution to multiple problems: it would help reduce
the state's overall water use, apply more water to urban uses, and help IID conserve water.
Interior and the State Water Board actively supported the transfer. It responded to
Interior's 1996 water reduction mandate by issuing California's "4.4 Plan," a draft plan that
proposed reducing the state's water use by 800,000 af over fifteen years through conservation
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measures such as a crop rotation, canal-seepage recovery, and groundwater banking (Colorado
River Board of California 2000). The 4.4 plan's cornerstone was the IID-SDCWA transfer and
would be ratified only once the individual agreements, like the transfer, were finalized. The
state moved to launch other features of the 4.4 plan. It created and successfully passed
legislation that included $200 million for canal lining projects. In 1998, Interior Secretary
Bruce Babbitt lauded the state's efforts: "I recognize the very considerable expenditure, both in
human and economic terms, that the state of California has invested in moving the plan
forward" (Israelsen 1998). The Dept. of Interior would move forward the development of
interim surplus guidelines for Lower Colorado River operations, which would serve as a buffer
during the state's water use transition. The Interior Secretary would thus allow California to
use surplus water as long as it met predetermined water use reduction benchmarks. California,
it seemed, finally had a path forward.
But as IID and SDCWA finalized the agreement, CVWD, MWD, and Imperial County filed
court actions to challenge the transfer. CVWD maintained that its next-in-line water right under
its shared priority use with IID meant that it had rights to any conserved water (Passell 1998).
In December 1998, CVWD and IID entered a "peace agreement" to undertake negotiations
(Israelsen 2003). Under an agreement signed the following year, CVWD's allocation was set at
330,000 af. SDCWA and IID would be able to proceed with the transfer with CVWA on board.
IID and SDCWA held separate negotiations with MWD. As part of the transfer, SDCWA
wanted to "wheel" the water via the 242-mile Colorado River Aqueduct, which the MWD
owned. MWD contended that the aqueduct could not be used without negotiating a price for its
use. The district first proposed to transfer the water at a cost of $262 per af, but SDCWA
argued the actual cost to wheel the water was $68 af (Elias 1997). The parties began to
negotiate an agreement that involved an exchange of payment for the transport of water.
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Under the exchange agreement, SDCWA agreed to pay $253 per af at the start of the transfer.
MWD, too, was now on board.
IID, SDCWA, MWD, and CVWA representatives approved the draft of keys terms of the
transfer, formally known as the Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA) in October 1999
(Imperial Irrigation District 1999). Over the following year, it would be circulated for public
review. The key terms were a prerequisite for Secretarial approval of the transfers. At the
same time, the state planned for the implementation of other features of the 4.4 plan (Stapleton
2001). These features included canal-lining measures that would save over 100,000 af. To
this point, the QSA parties, including the state and federal government, had amplified the scope
of the agreement to ensure its success.
As the water districts reviewed the QSA, however, IID faced increasing opposition to the
transfer at home. The environmental assessments were expected to demonstrate that the
transfer would erode the coastal line and increase salinity levels of the Salton Sea (Figure 3.3),
an enclosed saline lake and ecological sanctuary in northern Imperial County (Cohen 1999).
The lake was sustained through 1.34 maf of agricultural runoff from the Imperial Valley. Under
the IID-SDCWA transfer, the projected inflows would decrease to 1.23 maf and could be as low
as .93 af (U.S. Dept. of the Interior 2007). Lowered shorelines would lead to the concentration
of salts or other harmful chemicals, which would harm the ecological integrity of the Sea. The
IID and Imperial County officials worried that they would be held accountable for the
environmental consequences of the water transfer (Newcom 2003). County public health
officials were also concerned that exposed bottomlands might form "dust storms," aggravating
the Imperial Valley's already poor air quality (Cohen and Hyun 2006). The Nature Conservancy,
Environmental Defense, and Forest Community Research were among the organizations to
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publicly oppose the transfer (Yardas and Kusel 2006). The water transfer thought to solve
multiple problems at once seemed too risky.
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Figure 3.3 Salton Sea watershed map (California Environmental Protection Agency 2000)
The IID proposed a fallowing program to mitigate environmental impacts (Imperial
Irrigation District 2003). Under this voluntary program, farmers would be compensated for
letting their land sit idle; the freshwater that they would have normally used would flow
directly into the Sea. In a survey conducted by IID in October 1999, 160 farmers expressed
interest in such a program (Imperial Irrigation District 2003). However, the fallowing proposal
faced strong opposition due to its potential negative socioeconomic consequences. County
officials and advocacy groups such as Latino Issues Forum, United Farm Workers/La Union del
Pueblo Entero, and Institute for Socioeconomic Justice and Progressive Community
Development maintained that fallowing would affect everyone participating in the agricultural
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economy, including farm workers, wholesalers to farmers, and buyers and distributors of local
produce (Yardas and Kusel 2006). Socioeconomic uncertainty that might prevent IID board
members from voting in favor of the QSA put the transfer at risk.
Environmental and socioeconomic sticking points might have prevented IID's final sign-
off, but Interior continued to insist on an agreement. In January 2001, Secretary Bruce Babbitt
released 15-year interim guidelines for allocating surplus water, which would apply as long as
California was on track to reduce its consumption to 4.4 maf (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
2001). Southern California water districts would have to approve the QSA by December 31,
2002; the Interior Secretary would otherwise forcibly reduce the state's allocation. State
officials-State Water Board and state legislators-also became more involved in the
negotiations as the deadline loomed. Assembly Speaker Emeritus Robert Hertzberg led
negotiations (Yardas and Kusel 2006); he was joined by other state legislators from both
parties and from all of the parties' districts. During those negotiations, SDCWA agreed to
mitigate socioeconomic impacts by funding a mitigation program to be implemented by IID.
Federal and state officials used both carrots and sticks to impel an agreement.
On December 9, 2002, just days following the California Water Board's approval and
weeks before the Interior's deadline, the IID Board voted 3-2 against the transfer (Imperial
Irrigation District 2003). The dissenting Board Members held that they were not convinced
that the QSA and related agreements did enough to pay for environmental mitigation. This
rejection led to a legal struggle between IID and the Interior. On December 27, the Interior
Secretary decreased 204,900 af from IID's water order for 2003 (Miller 2003). lID sought and
was granted injunctive relief days later. IID's water order was restored in March, but Interior
would again decrease the water order by 330,000 af in July (Imperial Irrigation District 2003).
Fear of the potential collapse of QSA negotiations and a legal impasse sent Sacramento
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lawmakers, interior officials, and district representatives into a new phase of intense
negotiations (Imperial Irrigation District 2003). What emerged was the creation of new
institutional arrangements to support the environmental mitigation efforts, which would
mostly be led and funded by the state.
In the summer of 2003, water delivery to California had been reduced and IID was
prepared to vote against the QSA once again. The state, however, stepped in to enhance its
support of environmental mitigation measures through the passage of a package of legislation
to pay for associated costs (McCarthy and Newton 2008).
Negotiations between parties involved in the SDCWA-IID transfer had been in the works
for more than five years when Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton signed the Quantification
Settlement Agreement (QSA) and related agreements on October 16, 2003 in Boulder City,
Nevada. It was a compilation the main transfer agreement and 34 related agreements that
hinged on each other (Stapleton 2010). At the signing, the Secretary declared, "With this
agreement, conflict on the river is stilled" (Murphy 2003). That was the hope, anyway.
Value Creation
What began as a proposal to transfer water between two parties ended up as a more
encompassing agreement. Four major sticking points had emerged: water transport,
Coachella's water rights, and the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of the transfer.
QSA parties responded to the sticking points through the creation of all five types of value in
Albrecht and Albrecht's value typology (Table 3.3).
SDCWA worked with MWD to create an Exchange Agreement that would dictate the
terms of using the Colorado River Aqueduct (U.S. Department of Interior et al 2003). This
agreement included a pricing scheme under which SDCWA would initially pay $253 per af; the
45
water authority proposed value in the form of "money" to gain the use of the Colorado River
Aqueduct ("property"). In return, MWD would be responsible for delivering the water
("actions").
CVWD's long-standing concern over its water entitlement was addressed in several
ways, including a guaranteed allocation of 330,000 af, which secured it water "rights". The
district would also receive support from the state and MWD to implement conservation
measures. The support was key because the district was under pressure to make efficiency
improvements to its water system. The canal-lining project partly subsidized by the state also
contributed to Coachella's overall gains. At the onset of negotiations, even though CVWD's
interest in the transfer was chiefly about its entitlement, the district not only secured its water
rights but also gained from the larger suite of value proposed under the QSA and related
agreements.
Plans to mitigate the environmental impacts on the Salton Sea took the form of the
state's commitment to facilitate the implementation plan (McCarthy and Newton 2008). The
Department of Fish and Game was to serve as the lead implementing agency for the efforts.
Under the agreement, IID, CVWD and SDCWA were responsible for up for $133 million in
mitigation costs, and any excess costs were to be covered by the state (Jones 2004). The
"actions" and "money" the state put up reduced the "risk" that CVWD's, IID's and SDCWA's
would be left to handle mitigation on their own. As part of the agreement for the Salton Sea,
the parties agreed to create a Joint Powers Authority to manage the funds.
In response to socioeconomic concerns, SDCWA and IID conceptualized a
socioeconomic mitigation office called Local Entity. SDCWA, whose priority was to secure
additional water supply, agreed to pay IID $10 million; IID would also pay $10 million, and it
would administer, solicit claims for, and distribute the funds. Thus, the exchange involved
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created value in the form of "money" and "actions". The Local Entity was the cornerstone of a
broader agreement to socioeconomic concerns, and chief among them was how to conduct
economic analyses. The socioeconomic mitigation plan also included a regional economic
analyses plan. The water districts agreed to jointly hire a panel of economists to assess the
socioeconomic impact of the QSA.
For each response to a sticking point, the parties collaborated on the details of
implementation. In some responses, this collaboration involved creating organizations and
intuitional arrangements to support the implementation of the response to the sticking point.
This process also involved drawing value from other measures. For example, the canal-lining
project sponsored by the state was a decisive feature of negotiations, as different parties drew
from it to "create more" water.
Outcome
The QSA is a landmark agreement to reduce California's Colorado River water use, but it
has been fiercely challenged since it was signed in 2003. Several parties filed lawsuits against
the QSA-fifteen have been filed against IID alone (Varin 2012). Plaintiffs include parties who
were not a part of negotiations, such as the Imperial County Air Pollution Control District,
because the QSA did not address public health concerns. The QSA has also faced
implementation challenges. Most notably, the state has been slow to develop a Salton Sea
restoration plan (Imperial Irrigation District 2011).
Under the QSA and related agreements, California has begun to successfully reduce its
Colorado River water use through the water transfer and various conservation measures
(Stapleton 2010). It has also enabled basin-wide planning and collaboration. In 2007, for
example, California and other basin states updated the interim guidelines. Meanwhile, several
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courts have upheld the validity of the QSA, and most of the lawsuits filed against IID have been
dismissed (Varin 2012).
The QSA agreements enabled California to move toward its goal of reducing its water
use to its 4.4 maf apportionment while reconciling new water demands and uncertainty with
existing water uses. While agreement did not come easy, the QSA provides important lessons
on how to work toward a more collaborative approach to water planning.
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Table 3.3 Value creation in the Lower Colorado River Basin QSA
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State CVWD
Value
IID
I
MWD SDCWA
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Money
Property
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I Neutral
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Key
MWD to transport water via Colorado River Aqueduct (Actions) for a cost (Money).
SDCWA to pay for each af of transferred water (Money) and gain the use of the Colorado
River Aqueduct (Property). "San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) agreed to pay
MWD's wheeling charge... that water will be conveyed to SDCWA via MWD's Colorado River
Aqueduct as part of the IID-SDCWA water transfer agreement" (Water Education Foundation
2005).
CVWD to receive a legal entitlement of 330,000 af (Rights).
"This is about what CVWD's order has averaged in the last decade, but without the QSA the
amount is not guaranteed and subject to conditions beyond the district's control" (Coachella
Valley Water District 2003).
State to cover QSA mitigation costs in excess of $133 million (Money), which would reduce
mitigation "risk" for water districts. State also to play a key role in the development and
implementation of a restoration plan (Actions). CVWD, lID, and SDCWA to pay for
environmental mitigation (Money). 'To facilitate local agency execution of the QSA, the state
assumed responsibility for a share of the environmental mitigation requirements for the QSA
water transfers and for all of Salton Sea ecosystem restoration" (Jones 2004).
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IID to implement program to mitigate socioeconomic impact (Actions) with funding
provided by SDCWA (Money). SDCWA to fund program run by IID (Money).
"IID shall exercise best efforts to minimize socioeconomic impacts attributable to land that
will befallowed to transfer water to SDCWA. In designing and implementing the fallowing
P P P
A A A
, , .
I
program IID shallfurther seek to facilitate the voluntary, broad-based participation by
farmers to meet the long-term water delivery requirements to SDCWA" (United States 2003).
Note: IID would also fund the Local Entity, though that is not reflected in the table.
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4 Findings and Recommendations
"It is one thing tofindfault with an existing system. It is another thing altogether, a more difficult task, to
replace it with an approach that is better."
Nelson Mandela (World Commission on Dams 2000)
An examination of water allocation negotiations in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint (ACF) River and Lower Colorado River Basins supports my hypothesis that value creation
makes it easier for parties to reach agreement. The published literature on negotiation
suggests that parties are more likely to develop sustainable agreements and cooperative
relationships through an integrative approach to negotiation (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987,
Lax and Sebenius 1986). Further, it is easier for parties to respond to sticking points if they
engage in integrative bargaining (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991). Albrecht and Albrecht (1993)
provide a framework for differentiating various forms of value that can be created in
negotiation: money, property, actions, rights, and risks. An examination of value-both
proposed and gained-in my cases shows that value creation was, indeed, key to progress in
both negotiations, although agreement occurred in one case but not in the other. My findings
support the hypothesis that value creation enables agreement; they also suggest that even
when value is created, its allocation may prevent agreement among parties.
Analysis of Value Creation
ACF Basin
An examination of ACF negotiation outcomes indicates that value creation does not
necessarily lead to agreement. In the fifth year of negotiations, in 2003, the governors of
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Alabama, Florida and Georgia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that laid out the
key principles of an allocation formula. The MOU signed by the parties focused on creating
value mostly in terms of "actions" that Georgia was willing to take to meet Alabama and
Florida's downstream interests. Following the signing of the MOU, however, Florida tried to
adjust the terms to its advantage. The negotiations subsequently collapsed.
If value was created, why did the parties not reach agreement in the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin? The answer, I think, is that they failed to create
sufficient value (missing various types of value that could easily have been generated) and they
did not distribute the created value in ways that allowed all sides to commit to an agreement.
Several factors seemed to have inhibited the parties' ability to generate more value and
distribute it in a way that worked for all parties.
First, how the states negotiated with their internal constituencies was significant. Each
state's negotiator needs to be clear at the outset about his or her mandate (i.e., internal
prioritization of interests) and he or she needs to stay in touch with constituents so that the
final agreement has internal support. It appears that this clarity and connection did not
happen with all the states involved.
Second, Georgia was not open to making conservation measures for metropolitan
Atlanta as part of the interstate agreement. It did not want other states to dictate its internal
water policies. The parties were able to design a variable flow rate element for the
Apalachicola Bay, even though Georgia initially opposed minimum flow rates. However,
Georgia took the position that the flow rates and consumption caps, as proposed by Florida,
were mutually exclusive. If the states had been able to explore conservation measures more
fully, they might have ended up with a greater volume of water to allocate in future years.
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Third, while the states were engaged in negotiations, they also prepared to go to court.
In the literature on negotiation, each party's calculation of its Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement (BATNA) is crucial. This is the benchmark against which they compare all offers.
The parties knew that going to court was a possibility all along-after all, it was a lawsuit that
triggered the negotiations in the first place. It appears that a number of the parties had
optimistic views about how they might fare if the case went to a judge or jury. Perhaps the
clearest indication that several parties viewed their legal BATNA quite positively were the two
lawsuits filed while negotiations were ongoing. Unfortunately, these suits undermined trust
among the state negotiators. The states' view of their estimated outcomes if they went to court
-and the extent to which they continued to develop their legal BATNAs-may have affected
their commitment to the negotiations and their abilities to create value.
Fourth, apparently, the parties did not distribute value in a way that all sides thought
was fair. The outcome suggests that a particular commitment to a value proposition may mean
different things to different parties. The actions Georgia was willing to take under the MOU, for
example, sufficed for Alabama but not for Florida, even though the same things were offered.
When it came to distributing the value they had created, Florida did not feel it was getting a fair
shake, although it is not entirely clear that it was being asked to shoulder a disproportionate
burden. That Georgia created most of the value was also a cause for concern. When Florida
offered its counter-proposal, Georgia called it unfair. The outcome suggests that the value the
parties created was insufficient and it was not distributed in such a way that the parties felt
they had enough to arrive at a fair deal.
Lower Colorado River Basin
Water allocation negotiations in the Lower Colorado River Basin clearly support the hypothesis
that value creation enables agreement. After five years of negotiations, the Quantification
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Settlement Agreement (QSA) was signed in October 2003. The application of Albrecht and
Albrecht's framework to the parties' response to sticking points shows that various kinds of
value were created. This value supported the search for agreement in at least three ways.
First, the quantity and various types of value permitted mutually advantageous trade-
offs. In the QSA negotiations, when issues emerged, the parties found ways to address them.
This flexibility meant that value was created in response to unforeseen difficulties associated
with implementing the promised water transfer. The creation of this added value also made
the various trades contingent on each other. For example, even though the use of the Colorado
River Aqueduct involved only a transaction between Metropolitan Water District and San Diego
County Water Authority (SDCWA), it was critical because it was the only feasible means of
transferring water between Imperial Irrigation District (IID) and SDCWA. Thus, even if other
QSA parties did not directly benefit from a response to a sticking point, the overall package
hung together. In this way, the value created sufficed to meet the various parties' interests.
Second, a shared commitment to greater water efficiency and conservation enabled
agreement. The canal lining projects, for example, were key to "creating more water," as were
the conservation measures that IID and CVWA were required to implement under state
mandate. These shared values are important because most water disputes involve scarcity.
Conservation and efficiency will invariably form part of most dispute resolution efforts,
especially when questions arise about who is using too much water and who needs to reduce
their water use. In the QSA, water efficiency and conservation were achieved through the use
of five types of value noted in Albrecht and Albrecht's framework.
Finally, the parties created administrative and institutional arrangements to support
the implementation of the value-creating promises they had offered. The value created in
response to each sticking point depended on the detailed design and implementation of a
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specific plan of action. These responses were all contingent on each other. Indeed, in the end,
the QSA consisted of a main agreement-the transfer of the 200,000 af between SDCWA and
IID-as well as 34 related commitments. Several of these commitments involved the creation
of new institutional arrangements, including various means to mitigate the transfer's
socioeconomic and environmental impact. All the parties' highest priority concerns were
addressed.
Cross-Case Analysis
My cross-case analysis notes my estimates of the cumulative value created in both cases
-- both proposed and attained (Table 4.1). The QSA involved the creation of more diverse types
of value than the ACF MOU. Placing proposed value alongside gained value also demonstrates
how value takes different forms in water allocation negotiations.
Table 4.1 Value categories proposed and gained in the ACF and Lower Colorado River Basin
negotiations
Value Element ACF MOU Lower Colorado River QSA
Proposed
Money
Property
Actions
Rights
Risks
S-'VV
G__ained
Money
Property
Actions
Rights V
Risks
In sum, value creation enables but does not guarantee agreement. Value creation offers a way
to get beyond what might otherwise seem like intractable problems. Its efficacy is contingent
on other factors, such as the extent to which the value created responds to the priority
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concerns of all parties and having the agreement describe believable ways of holding all parties
to their commitments.
Limitations and Areas for Future Research
My findings suggest possible areas for future research. First, different administrative
frameworks apply in the ACF and Lower Colorado River Basins. The Southeast primarily uses a
riparian doctrine, whereas a prior appropriation doctrine is predominantly used in the
Southwest. The backgrounds of the cases indicate that parties in both basins had the authority,
flexibility, and opportunity needed to create value. This finding counters the perception that
the overarching administrative framework in the region dictates the outcome of water
allocation negotiations. Future research, however, might explore the impact of administrative
frameworks on the shape and outcome of various kinds of water allocation negotiations.
Second, I do not consider the full history of water development and conflict in each
basin. Water conflicts are deep-seated in the Southwest. This history of water conflict has
earned the Bureau of Reclamation an influential role in the management of the Colorado River.
This history and strong federal participation may have played a role in impelling the parties to
reach an agreement. The literature on negotiation suggests that parties can learn to work more
collaboratively over time because they learn the consequences of not reaching agreement, as
well as how to improve upon any agreements previously reached (Innes and Booher 2010).
The Southeast lacked both a strong role for the federal government and a history of conflict.
Thus, future research on value creation may consider the extent to which a history of conflict
plays into the parties' ability to generate value.
Third, the parties involved in the two negotiations represented different roles in the
overall water governance structure. The parties in the ACF Basin were three states, whereas
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the parties in the Lower Colorado Basin were primarily regional water suppliers, with strong
state and federal partners. Some may be inclined to deduce that the negotiation outcomes may
be explained by the differences in these intergovernmental relationships-that the higher the
scale, the more difficult it is to create value (i.e., it becomes harder among three large states).
For that to be true, we would need to understand what is inherently different about water
institutions at different scales that affects their ability to effectively participate in integrative
negotiations. Currently, no perceived relationship exists between scale and outcome, but the
literature on water allocation negotiations would benefit from added insight into this area.
Fourth, I used Albrecht and Albrecht's framework to ascribe value to negotiation
outcomes. This ascription involved a great deal of interpretation on my part. It is possible that
participants in the negotiations might not characterize the value created in the same way I
have. Is it also possible that the parties proposed or gained kinds of value that I have missed
and that go beyond the kinds that Albrecht and Albrecht specify. Cultural and political value,
for example, may have played a role in ACF and Lower Colorado River Basin negotiations, but
that analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Finally, I focused on negotiation outcomes. I did not explore all the things that cause
parties to shift from traditional value-claiming to value-creating behaviors. My findings are
thus helpful only insofar as readers can "back into" negotiations-by looking at outcomes.
More needs to be done to determine the best ways of helping parties prepare for integrative
negotiations.
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Recommendations
The creation of value can promote agreement, but water officials need to know how to
proceed. Drawing from the lessons learned from these two cases, I offer several tentative
recommendations.
Value Creation Preparation
Build and improve integrative negotiation skills and capacity. Value creation is the
cornerstone function of an integrative negotiation, but value on its own will not lead to an
agreement. Knowledge of the strategies and techniques of integrative bargaining and a well-
designed negotiation process will better enable parties to get to the point of creating the value
necessary to work toward an agreement. Without a deliberate and well-executed process,
parties may revert to a traditional approach to negotiations (a distributive approach) or make
slow, if any progress. From the onset, parties would benefit from applying the lessons of
integrative negotiations to get to and through the value-creation process.
Check any BATNA at the door. Literature on negotiation encourages parties to build their
BATNAs during negotiations as a means to evaluate agreements (Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry
2010). This idea is partly based on the assumption that the parties do not have to work
together over the long-term. However, memories of injustice often rankle. Because water is a
shared resource and water problems are increasingly complex, parties can be liable to
underestimating the value of an agreement in relation to their BATNA, especially if the
alternative is legal recourse. The history of interstate water allocation in AFC negotiations
indicates that parties who previously believed that litigation was a better alternative to
reaching agreement may find themselves in contention nearly ten years later. Thus, parties
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should think more strategically about whether legal recourse actually offers a better
alternative, should be deliberate, and should fully commit to the negotiation (or alternative)
path chosen. Otherwise, they risk losing large amounts of time and resources, as well as
damaging the parties' rapport.
Value Types
Diversify value types. Enhanced diversity of value forms will offer a broader range of
benefits. All of Albrecht and Albrecht's value categories were proposed or gained in the ACF
and Lower Colorado River Basins. These were combined to meet the interests of the various
parties. In the ACF, the parties mainly worked with one form of proposed value - "actions" -
which was mostly proposed by Georgia and ultimately insufficient for Alabama and Florida.
Greater amounts of value and diverse types of value can meet parties' interests in ways that
were previously unthinkable. Water officials should consider the full range of value available to
explore these options.
Achieve greater water efficiency and conservation through value. Aiming for water
conservation and efficiency is one way to create value (Susskind and Islam 2012), but the cases
show that value creation on its own will not lead to greater water efficiency and conservation.
Rather, parties must make a deliberate effort to build efficiency and conservation measures
through value that is proposed. In the Lower Colorado River Basin, water conservation was
key to enabling parties reach agreement, and it was achieved through money and actions
proposed and gained by the parties. As a result, several water system improvements were
made (e.g., fallowing and use of conservation technology). Water conservation did not form
part of the ACF MOU. Because water scarcity is likely to be a problem in many water disputes,
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parties would benefit from considering water efficiency and conservation a key part of their
plan.
What to do with value
Fairly distribute value. Value must be distributed fairly. In the case of the Lower Colorado
River Basin, the entities worked to develop solutions that addressed all the signatory parties'
interests, but the parties worked to get to that point. In the ACF Basin, the MOU was perceived
as unfair by Florida, while Georgia perceived Florida's suggested changes to MOU as unfair;
negotiations collapsed. Water officials should thus learn about each other's interests to have a
sense of how value achieves goals that meet their interests. This learning needs to be done by
and for all participating parties.
Support value through new institutional arrangements. Having cumulative value enables
the making of trade-offs, and these trade-offs will likely require jointly designed and
coordinated institutional arrangements. The Salton Sea Protection Plan and the Local Entity,
for example, were new administrative entities created to address environmental and
socioeconomic mitigation of the water transfer in the Lower Colorado River Basin. Conversely,
parties in the ACF Basin wanted to create the principles of an allocation formula without
delving into the details of their implementation. Water officials should thus be prepared not
only to create value, but also to take the steps needed to turn created value into responses with
the institutional support to make them durable, efficient, and implementable. This institutional
support is particular helpful in cases with heightened uncertainty, because parties will know
how to work together when water conditions change.
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Final Thoughts
When United States Governors convened at the White House in 1908 for a conference
on the country's natural resources, they called for greater cooperation (Conference of
Governors 1909). Today, this mandate is as relevant as ever. Importantly, uncertainty
surrounding water availability has increased. Water allocation negotiations in the ACF and
Lower Colorado River Basins demonstrate that cooperation is possible, even if it is no simple
feat.
With this research, I hope to have made two contributions. First, my study shows how
value creation can move a water allocation negotiation forward. My analysis links ideas from
the field of negotiation with the dynamics of actual water allocation negotiations. I hope I have
created a more thorough picture of how value can be created. What is "proposed" by one party,
for example, must meet the other party's interests, and thus not all value-creating moves will
necessarily succeed. Creative problem-solving is called for to identify what each party values.
Second, I hope these findings contribute to a broader discussion of ways to respond to
complex water challenges. Heightened water conflict in the United States and abroad is
anticipated. In fact, the need to develop sound and fair water allocation negotiation outcome
has never been so pressing, necessitating a focus on ways to respond. The strategies and
techniques of integrative bargaining, and value creation in particular, can unlock a forward-
thinking approach and enable agreement.
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